new playbook hits corrupt bankers
case-based reform—how is this shifting policy?
individuals no longer the focus
system-wide vectors of corruption in the crosshairs with strategic monitoring
targeting young cadres, new appointees, and critical staffprovincial fiefdoms under threat
Probes into two former Sichuan banking regulators within a week signal a step up in anti-corruption moves in the banking sector. Wang Zeping 王泽平 and Wang Junquan 王筠权, former Party secretaries and directors of the Sichuan Banking Regulatory Bureau, were investigated by CCDI (Central Commission for Discipline Inspection) on 30 May and 6 June respectively.
It was no coincidence. A day before Wang Junquan was probed, Qu Jishan 曲吉山, head of the CCDI team embedded in the PBoC, held a work meeting to 'hold the integrity baseline'. This joint nationwide action signals Beijing's struggle with entrenched networks that have long plagued provincial financial oversight.
corruption epicentre: local banks
Local banks are known epicentres of corruption: they approve credit for provincial business. Investigations by China Financial Network across six provinces in February 2025 uncovered how officials systematically turn their lending power into steady profits through high-return investment schemes, irregular loan approvals worth billions, and illegal stock deals.
Corruption thrives in the ‘everyone knows everyone’ environment of provincial banking. Local business owners, regulators, and bank executives form networks that render oversight at the provincial level useless—they all know each other.. Corrupt officials now employ 'technical corruption' using sophisticated methods—proxy shareholdings, fake loan documents, cross-border transactions, cryptocurrency, and structured investment vehicles—to obscure traditional bribery.
This complexity explains why Beijing's CCDI teams have become essential. Provincial corruption networks require specialised investigations, including advanced forensic accounting and cryptocurrency tracing that can only be undertaken by central teams operating independent of local influence networks.
case-based reform takes centre stage
The Sichuan cases barely scratch the surface in ‘a big year for financial sector anti-corruption’, as the CCDI warned in January 2025. Preliminary China Financial Network data shows that at least 90 financial executives were under investigation in 2024 alone, with 60 percent of cases involving the banking system. This followed over 100 probes in 2023.
CCDI’s finger-pointing at the financial sector implies more than routine housecleaning. ‘Cracking down on major violations that disrupt the market’ is a priority for the final year of the 14th 5-year plan.
Anti-corruption action in the past focused on individual malfeasance. Current moves step up this earlier work, now targeting
both bribe givers and takers: no longer focused solely on corrupt officials, institutions that corrupt them are included
revolving doors: scrutiny of career paths between regulatory agencies and the private sector
provincial-level networks: recognition that corruption often operates through local power structures
These highlight 'case-based’ reform, championed in a February 2025 speech by Qu. ‘Case-based’ draws lessons from in-depth analysis of specific real-world cases—such as incidents, scandals, or examples of corruption—to inform broader systemic changes. Shifting from conventional punitive anti-corruption cases against individuals, it goes to the ‘systemic’ heart linking investigation, analysis, and institutional reform.
'We must deepen case-based reform and governance,’ Qu explained at PBoC's disciplinary inspection conference, ‘to eradicate common roots of financial sector corruption'. This entails
investigation: mapping corruption networks, not individual malfeasance
root cause analysis: identifying systemic vulnerabilities
institutional reform: redesigning power structures and oversight mechanisms
non-stop monitoring: eliminating recurrence
Formalising 'case-based reform’ for key sectors from SOEs and pharma to firefighting and sports, CCDI now requires it throughout the entire investigative process.
patterns of regulatory capture
In the PRC financial context, regulatory capture entails
local government protection of regional banks
'revolving doors' between regulators and industry
information skewed in favour of insiders
stability rewarded over enforcement
Regulatory capture in the PRC financial system has deep roots. How industry interests hijacked those in high positions was exposed by the 2017 case of Xiang Junbo 项俊波, former CIRC (China Insurance Regulatory Commission) chair, who received 11 years for bribes taken in exchange for product approvals.
Just a week after starting as leader of the National Financial Regulatory Administration's Complaint Mediation Centre preparatory team in May 2024, Ren Chunsheng 任春生 was investigated. His nose-dive suggests monitoring of his activities even before his appointment, or as is often the case, internal power struggles.
counting the cost
Corrupt financial regulators damage market confidence and economic stability. Historical examples
2015 stock market crash: failure to curb margin lending and speculation, influenced by lobbying from brokerage houses, contributed to a market collapse that wiped out US$5 tn in value
2013 shadow banking crisis: coddling of regional banks by local regulators proliferated risky financing vehicles, creating systemic risk that persists today
2011–17 insurance sector: lax oversight under Xiang Junbo green-lit predatory insurers like Anbang, ending in state intervention
Probed in April 2024, Wang Jianjun 王建军 CSRC vice-chairman was a recent high-profile casualty in the securities sector. Such crises typically stem from compromised oversight.
⚡️sharp policy focus, inbox delivery
new playbook
Beijing's anti-corruption strategy has shifted in three ways. Case-based reform now targets entire corruption networks, not just individuals. Local banks have become the main focus because they control provincial lending. The campaign now goes after both top executives and their regulators, recognising they often work together through revolving doors.
These shifts are intensified through upgraded protocols—CCDI introduced 'joint investigation and joint rectification' in 2025, moving beyond 2024's separate treatment of corruption and misconduct to integrated approaches. This reflects Qu Jishan's strategy to ‘more effectively clear out accumulated corruption', targeting decades-old networks rather than just preventing new cases.
Supervision has also become more targeted. The 2025 approach expands beyond 2024's focus on 'key subgroups’ and young cadres to four-category monitoring: top leaders, young cadres, newly promoted officials, and personnel in critical positions.
This means more senior executives and regulators will face investigation, including retired ones whose networks shaped current corrupt practices. As they trace professional networks built over decades, anti-corruption investigators will likely target groups of corrupt officials who worked together or knew each other throughout their careers. Beijing now hopes a 'systemic' approach can eliminate decades of embedded corruption—somehow.
knee cappers
Qu Jishan 曲吉山 | CCDI chief inspector, PBoC
Speaking at the PBC's 2025 comprehensive Party discipline and disciplinary inspection work conference on 21 February, Qu outlined his vision for financial sector cleanup
We must deepen case-based reform and governance to eradicate the common roots of corruption in the financial sector. This means relentlessly correcting the ‘four winds’ (improper practices), never stopping in punishing corruption, focusing on key areas, key people, and key matters, strictly investigating typical cases where misconduct and corruption are intertwined.
A long-time discipline inspector, Qu rose through the ranks of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. Since September 2022, he has led action to enforce Party discipline and combat corruption within the central bank and the broader financial sector. He is also a member of the PBOC's Party Committee and a member of the 20th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection. Qu holds a Master of Science degree.
Central Commission for Discipline Inspection | 中央纪律检查委员会
Under Xi Jinping, CCDI has evolved into the Party's central disciplinary authority, becoming a pillar of Xi’s vast governance framework. The 2018 merger with the National Supervision Commission, which also absorbed previously fragmented anti-corruption units, created unprecedented institutional power through the ‘one institution, two names framework,’ delivering CCDI unfettered authority over corruption probes.
The 2024–25 campaign demonstrates CCDI's expanded reach through systematic enforcement. It handled 92 central-level cadres in 2024, and 57 ‘tigers’ at provincial and ministerial levels—the highest annual total in recent years. High-profile cases spanned former party secretaries such as Wu Yingjie 吴英杰 (Tibet) and Luo Baoming 罗保铭 (Hainan) to ministry heads including Tang Renjian 唐仁健 (Agriculture) and Gou Zhongwen 苟仲文 (Sports).
Beyond individual prosecutions, CCDI conducted thorough sector-wide investigations targeting finance, state-owned enterprises, energy, and pharmaceuticals where ‘power is concentrated, funds are abundant, and resources are rich.’ Total grassroots misconduct cases reached 70.5 million, with disciplinary sanctions imposed on 530,000 individuals, demonstrating systematic control from Politburo-level officials down to village committees—an institutional reach unimaginable before the Xi era.
The internal watchdog of the Communist Party, the Commission, is the highest internal body tasked with anti-corruption investigations and enforcing Party rules. It is elected and supervised by the CCP National Congress, with members serving five-year terms. The CCDI’s main responsibilities include
enforcing the Party constitution and internal regulations
coordinating and leading anti-corruption efforts
safeguarding the authority of the CCP and the core position of the general secretary, currently Xi Jinping
The CCDI also has its own Organisation and Propaganda offices, giving it unique autonomy within the Party structure.
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