new ‘Export to China’ campaign picks theme countries rolling out exhibitions and matchmaking to boost imports
Beijing is hinting at a shift.
In its proposal for the 15th 5-year plan, the CPC’s Fourth Plenum amplified Xi’s mantra of ‘changes not seen in a century’ and the mounting external headwinds now buffeting the PRC economy. The CPC sees the global economic order that powered decades of growth fracturing, and knows its playbook no longer works.
For those decades, Beijing’s growth engine ran on a simple bargain: exporting manufactured goods to the West in exchange for dollars and high-end technology. But it is now buckling under worsening geopolitical ties, ballooning trade surpluses, and a world now wary of imbalances. With the trade surplus up 22 percent year-on-year—hitting a staggering US$1 trillion in the first eleven months of 2025—Beijing knows the status quo is unsustainable and politically combustible.
The strategy is to build a balanced global trade system in which imports play a purposeful role in securing long-term growth and security.
Beijing recognises that a new global economic paradigm must take shape, with trade running both ways. ‘Expand international circulation’ has been added as a priority under commerce in the 15th plan proposal.
Beijing’s focus is on determining which imports best serve its national goals.
Recent moves underscore how Beijing is leveraging imports. To judge by weak total import volumes alone—and conclude that Beijing is sidelining its international purchases—misses the targeted and strategic ways imports are being deployed by the Party to support its broader, longer-term priorities.
The ‘Export to China’ campaign aims to rebrand the PRC as a destination market for foreign goods rather than just an exporter, using 5-6 annual theme countries and 100+ events to connect global sellers with Chinese buyers through exhibitions, e-commerce platforms, and import zones. The initiative frames PRC market opening as both a response to trade partners’ concerns and a complement to its ‘Invest in China’ push, betting that more foreign investment will drive import demand while expanded consumer choice supports domestic consumption growth.
a new trade geography
Trade with BRI (Belt and Road) economies now makes up about half of total flows (see figure one). While the PRC trade share with advanced economies (US, EU, Japan), dominant under the old economic paradigm, keeps dropping.
PRC trades more with BRI than the US+EU+Japan (percent of total)
The old model is unsustainable. The widening trade gap reflects several forces: imports have been held back by trade friction and weak demand tied to real estate and infrastructure, and growing import substitution, while exports have stayed firm due to broader markets, lower product prices and successful industrial policies.
Beijing also realises that the growing trade imbalance is ‘passive’, shaped partly by sanctions and weak exchange rates, and one that risks fuelling tensions abroad.
A new globalisation is taking shape, pivoting from ‘dollars for goods’ to ‘goods for raw materials’, declares Song Guoyou 宋国友 Fudan University American Studies Centre, indicating that PRC–BRI trade will keep growing over PRC–US trade. But as widening imbalances threaten BRI partners’ economies as well, trade headwinds now also blow at Beijing from the Global South.
steering the new paradigm
Beijing has been outlining how it plans to shape a new global trade paradigm. Visions for an ’open economy’ or ’open trade’ see the state steering resources for national ‘development and security’ goals—diverging from conventional ‘free trade’ which leans on deregulation and a ‘level playing field’.
Comparative advantage matters, but selective barriers will remain to shield national interests.
Since 2017, ‘development and security’ have been repeated priorities in top meetings and papers; they were listed as a goal for the 15th 5-year plan by the Politburo in September 2025 and added as a main objective in the latest Foreign Trade Law draft.
These ‘development and security’ goals have some clear traits. Development is supply-led, focused on long-term growth and industrial upgrading, while security centres on ‘self-sufficiency’ and addressing risk. This lens helps shed light on how imports fit in Beijing’s thinking.
On the development side, imports are seen as a tool for long-term growth and industrial upgrading. By encouraging two-way trade, Beijing aims to build more sustainable and balanced relationships with trading partners— the large trade surplus could be a foundation for expanded imports. At the same time, selective imports of advanced inputs and lower-cost products boost resource efficiency and expose domestic industries to foreign competition. In contrast, targeted import substitution supports technological self-reliance.
On the security front, imports play a multifaceted role. They secure access to strategic resources—agricultural products, energy, and raw materials—while helping ease geopolitical tension fuelled by trade imbalances. Beijing also views its vast domestic market as a source of geopolitical leverage, a tool it has already used effectively in technology and agriculture and may expand further through ‘unilateral opening’ policies.
Expanding imports could also mitigate some financial risk by encouraging outward credit flows, promoting global use of the RMB, and supporting a ‘manufactured goods for raw materials’ model that reduces dependence on the dollar. Finally, Beijing remains acutely aware of the social stability risks posed by deindustrialisation, using imports strategically to protect domestic manufacturing capacity.
policy tools in action
Across several sectors, Beijing is leveraging imports to advance these ‘development and security’ goals.
By stepping up state direction, the centre has tightened control and merged major SOEs. These firms now handle much of the PRC’s large purchases, especially in commodities and energy. Beijing has used them to strategically raise or cut imports in key areas to gain sway in trade disputes or to strike better deals. One example is the creation of CMRG (China Mineral Resources Group) to centralise buying power.
The state firm has reportedly used its large-buyer market power to push Australian iron ore suppliers for better terms or RMB settlement in 2025. Beijing has also been bolstering its legal toolkit for trade retaliation. In the amended Foreign Trade Law draft, the scope of countermeasures was widened, and penalties for helping to evade them were tightened. The draft also called for more policy support for trading firms.
The state’s visible hand is also seen in its ‘selective opening’ approach to imports. From 2019–25, Beijing expanded import licence controls over some specialised high-value tech to drive industrial upgrades, while easing rules on mid-range equipment. Import tariffs rose to shield certain sectors in chemicals and food, but fell for some medical products, high-tech parts and green products. Goods where the PRC no longer holds a production edge or faces supply gluts now receive less protection. PRC average import tariff rates now sit at around seven percent, down from about 15 percent in 2001.
FTAs are leading tariff cuts with partners (mostly BRI and Global South), strengthening ties and driving the recent export rally. Imports from BRI partners make up nearly half of total imports and some 65 percent of commodities, reflecting a broader pivot from Western suppliers. FTAs with countries like the Maldives, Nicaragua and Ecuador have lowered PRC tariffs on their ag goods and raw materials, while giving Beijing better access for its manufactured goods and equipment. Zero-tariffs for Least Developed Countries with ties to the PRC were expanded.
To promote collective growth, Beijing should go further and grant preferential tariffs to developing, as well as least developed countries, urged Li Gang 李钢 China Association of International Trade. Beijing is also testing alternative currency settlements for major commodity purchases. Around 20 percent of its iron ore imports are now settled in RMB, up from ten percent in 2023, and 70 percent of soybean imports from Brazil were paid in local currencies in 2024.
Beijing is aware of the gap between its ‘nominal openness’ and the reality, where behind-the-border, beyond market access barriers still trip up imports. PRC ’institutional opening’ is driving reforms to let markets better allocate resources across borders and boost economic efficiency, notes Jiang Xiaojuan 江小涓 China Society of Industrial Economics.
Recent moves include campaigns to clear national market barriers and enforce WTO compliance. Progress will come gradually, with bolder steps first tested in special zones like free trade zones and the Hainan Free Trade Port. A nation with strong tech capacities must run large imports and exports, drawing in the world’s best inputs for optimal output, Jiang has said on many occasions.
import champions
Beijing’s ‘development and security priorities’ also shape which import champions receive blessings.
The services trade sector is not viewed in isolation but as a ‘multiplier’ for growing other industries. Leading policy papers call for importing services the country ‘urgently needs’—especially productive services that can strengthen PRC manufacturing and lift its place in the global value chain. Other services imports in consumption, medicine, entertainment and green development are also highlighted.
Noting that the ongoing services trade deficit shows the need to make its firms more competitive worldwide, the 15th 5‑year plan proposes to grow and open the services sector, said Long Guoqiang 隆国强 State Council Development Research Centre. Opening up, he added, will help reform the sector and lift its position globally.
Outbound tourism, a source for services imports, is likewise encouraged to boost people-to-people exchanges. In a post-pandemic rebound, tourism is now the largest sector in services trade, spiking by 12 percent y-o-y in H1 2025. New visa-free agreements have tilted towards pushing PRC travellers to BRI and ASEAN partners. Recent examples include Malaysia, Samoa, Solomon Islands and Thailand.
Imports of critical minerals have become central to ’resource security’ as these materials shift from economic inputs to levers of technology, diplomacy and power. Beijing holds an edge in midstream processing and refining, but still depends on imports for most upstream supplies. As these minerals underpin advanced manufacturing and future industries, supply security is being treated as a core growth task. Oversight is being tightened through export curbs and tougher audits of overseas reserves.
rethinking settlement
PRC experts are also urging wider partnerships to spread risk, cut reliance on any single source, and deepen ties with developing partners across APEC, RCEP and the BRI. To foster the ‘manufactured goods for raw materials’ trade loop with Global South partners, Beijing is rethinking how trade is settled, promoting greater use of local currencies and a larger role for the RMB. It remains wary about moving too fast, aware that the currency needs more backing and a broader range of RMB‑denominated financial products to absorb foreign holdings. Imports of precious metals, notably gold and silver, play a role in this push.
Beijing has stepped up gold purchases, eased import rules and encouraged more trading. Shoring up the currency and giving RMB internationalisation firmer credibility at its current turning point is considered key to national finance priorities.
Consumption in the PRC remains weak. While there has yet to be a major program to raise low household income shares, Beijing has doubled down on supply-side measures, rooted in the view that supply shortfalls are one reason for sluggish consumption, especially in services. Recent major policy steps include two pilot drives to boost ’new consumption’ and build an ’international consumer environment’.
This encompasses goods and services that reflect rising quality expectations. These include digital services, cultural activities, sports and fitness, nutrition, new energy and eco-friendly products, healthcare services, etc. Each pilot is offered C¥ nine‑figure central funding to spur spending.
Foreign brands and service providers stand to gain from these new policy supports. Beijing is also widening CBEC (cross-border e-commerce) retail import pilots and permitted lists as part of its drive to boost imports. Imports now make up 23 percent of total CBEC, up from some 14 percent in 2019, and are steadily catching up with exports in growth.
CBEC growth slows, imports catch up (y-o-y changes in percent)
looking ahead
Trade is now deeply entangled with politics, as Liu Yuanchun 刘元春 Shanghai University of Finance and Economics has warned. A geoeconomic order shaped by security concerns and bloc formation is replacing the old model of free trade—rooted in efficiency, comparative advantage, and mutual dependence. Major powers are pursuing ‘self-reliance’ and ‘de-risking,’ and engagement with Beijing’s import policies must be viewed through this lens, weighing commercial gains against broader strategic trade-offs.
Beijing knows the old model is finished. It is moving decisively to build a new one, with imports now a frontline instrument. The principle of two-way trade remains central, and the PRC is likely to prioritise imports that serve its national goals. While weak domestic demand will keep progress gradual, cooperation aligned with those priorities could offer new openings for foreign firms. The 15th 5-year plan bears watching for measures that lift consumption and imports, such as structural reforms to strengthen household incomes and the social safety net.
The pace of change is picking up; the next plan will set the timetable.
open trade experts
Bai Ming 白明 | MofCOM Research Institute Degree Committee member
Amid strong global enthusiasm for selling into the PRC market, Beijing needs sober judgement, notes Bai. While the PRC remains firm in its goal of widening imports, the focus should be on quality, not just scale, he added. Beijing must act within its means to avoid upsetting the balance of payments, and treat imports as an expenditure that calls for careful selection of goods and trade partners to ensure funds are well spent, argues Bai.
Sitting on MofCOM’s expert committee, Bai is vocal in state media about global trade. His home agency, CAITEC, is a leading trade think tank. Forthright views from its staff often circulate in the media. Bai’s department researches commodity markets and global investment flows.
Zhang Yansheng 张燕生 | Chinese Academy of Macroeconomic Research researcher
Relying on retaliation and expanding imports to correct trade imbalances (with the US) is misguided, argues Zhang, noting that such a response would only prompt Washington to erect more trade barriers. A sounder approach, he argues, is to focus on ‘doing our own thing well’—expanding domestic demand steadily, cultivating new quality productive forces, further internationalising the economy and advancing institutional reform.
A former director of the NDRC (National Development and Reform Commission) External Economic Research Institute. He taught at the Central University of Finance and Economics 1984–96 and was an exchange scholar at the University of Toronto and the World Bank from 1986–88. Zhang enjoys a State Council stipend. He now serves as a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Macroeconomic Research.
Jiang Xiaojuan 江小涓 | China Society of Industrial Economics president
‘Institutional opening’ means allowing the market to play a more decisive role in allocating resources across borders, argues Jiang. This approach, she says, should remain neutral—neither favouring imports nor exports. The market, not policy bias, should decide which sectors, firms and products serve the PRC best. The goal here is to work towards leveraging international trade to boost the efficiency of the domestic economy, she adds.
A Chinese Academy of Social Sciences research professor, Jiang is a veteran trade expert. She has held high-level posts across academia and government. She was the former Dean of Tsinghua University‘s School of Public Policy and Management. She also served as a State Council deputy secretary-general, National People’s Congress Standing Committee member and Vice Chairperson of the NPC Social Construction Committee.
All these articles are opening doors to get a clear insight into China's policy perspective inward and outward through the views of persons who are experts in their own fields.
This could definitely be a major new trend